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Principal and Income Allocation of Stock
Distributions-The Six Per Cent Rule
A productive trust is usually dynamic in two ways: the principal
assets appreciate in value, and their use produces income. When the
beneficial interests in such a trust are successively divided between
income recipients and -principal remaindermen, every payment to
the trust must be characterized either as income or as an addition
to principal. The most difficult categorization problems arise when
the receipt is of corporate stock. 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, the two most important methods of categorization
were specified by the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts rules. 2 The
Pennsylvania rule allocates to income that portion of a stock dividend attributable to earnings accruing to the corporation during
the period of the trust, and to principal that portion of the dividend
arising out of earnings accruing prior to the creation of the trust. 8
Although designed to be a rule of fairness, this rule often requires
a detailed analysis of corporate accounting practices, and has consequently proved unwieldy.4 The Massachusetts rule, on the other
hand,_was designed for administrative convenience. For all practical
purposes stock distributions5 under this rule are allocable entirely
to principal. 6 Although the weight of authority originally favored
I. See generally BoGEAT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES §§ 841-59 (2d ed. 1962); 3 Scorr, TRUSTS
§ 236 (2d ed. 1956). For some interesting statistics on the growing popularity of com•
mon stock as a trust investment, see Barclay, Bank Trust Investments Surveyed, 103
TRUSTS & EsTATES 682 (1964).
2. The Kentucky rule allocated all extraordinary stock dividends to the life tenant,
regardless of their source. Hite's Devisees v. Hite's E.x'r, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S,W. 778 (1892).
The rule was rejected by the Kentucky court in Bowles v. Stilley's Ex'r, 267 S,W,2d 707
(Ky. 1954), and does not appear -to be currently in effect in any jurisdiction.
3. 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 236.3, at 1813 (2d ed. 1956). See generally Brigham, Pennsylvania
Rules Governing the Allocation of Receipts Derived by Trustees From Shares of Stoel,,
85 U. PA. L. REv. 358 (1937); Cohan & Dean, Legal, Tax and Accounting Aspects of
Fiduciary Apportionment of Stock Proceeds: The Non-Statutory Pennsylvania Rules,
106 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1957).
4. See Matter of Payne, 7 N.Y.2d 1, 194 N.Y.S.2d 465, 163 N.E.2d 301 (1959); Cather•
wood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961); Browning, Extraordinary Corporate Distribu•
tions Under the New York Law of Trusts, 4 SYRACUSE L. REv. 293 (1953); Grossman, Mechanics of Apportionment of Receipts From Shares of Stock, 65 DICK. L. REv. 179 (1961);
Machen, The Apportionment of Stock Distributions in Trust Accounting Practice, 20
MD. L. REv. 89 (1960); Tenney, Stock Splits-The Trustee's Dilemma, PROCEEDINGS OF
BANKING LAW SECiloN, N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, l (1959).
5. For present purposes the phrase "stock distribution" refers only to a corporation's
distribution of its own shares. The Revised Uniform Act and the New York act both
allocate distributions of another corporation's stock to income. In addition, the phrase
refers only to stock dividends and stock splits. Shares received in a merger or reorganization, rights to subscribe to stock, and liquidation distributions are excluded. There is
now basic agreement on the treatment to be given these items. See note 17 infra.
6. See Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868). See generally BOGERT, TRUSTS &: TRUSTEES
§ 850 (2d ed. 1962). Although extraordinary stock dividends and all stock splits are
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the Pennsylvania approach, the Massachusetts rule has become predominant in later years. The experiences of Pennsylvania and New
York are illustrative of the problems created by this historical evolution. Pennsylvania originated its rule of apportionment in 1857.1
The rule remained in full effect in Pennsylvania until the Uniform
Principal and Income Act, which inc9rporated the Massachusetts
rule, was adopted in 19458 and given retroactive effect by judicial
decision in 1961.9 In New York, early decisions held that all stock
dividends declared out of earnings were income, without regard to
when the earnings were accumulated.10 The Pennsylvania rule was
adopted in 1913,11 however, and until 1963 governed the allocation
of stock distributions to trusts created prior to 1926. Trusts created
subsequent to 1926 were governed by the Massachusetts rule, adopted
by statute in that year. 12 In 1963 both New York and Pennsylvania
enacted legislation rejecting their Massachusetts rules and adopting
versions of what has come to be called the "six per cent rule." 18 New
allocable to principal, it has never been clear how the Massachusetts rule would treat
an ordinary stock dividend, but because of the rarity of such a device the classification
problem is not serious. In any event, there is authority that such distributions would
be allocated to principal. See Eastman v. State Bank, 259 Ill. App. 607 (1931); Rhode
Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Tucker, 51 R.I. 507, 155 Atl. 661 (1931).
7. See Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
8. Laws of Pa. 1945, P.L. 416, as amended, P.L. 1283 (1947).
9. See Catherwood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961). The constitutionality of
giving principal and income statutes retroactive effect has been questioned. In Crawford Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949), the Pennsylvania Principal and Income
Act was denied retroactive effect. However, Catherwood overruled Crawford and two
cases which had followed it: Warden Trust, 382 Pa. 311, 115 A.2d 159 (1955); Pew
Trust, 362 Pa. 468, 67 A.2d 129 (1,949). New Jersey followed the Crawford decision and
denied its Principal and Income Act retroactive effect in In re Fera, 26 N.J. 131, 139
A.2d 23 (1958). However, all constitutional objection to specific legislative retroactivity
in New Jersey was removed by In re Arens, 41 N.J. 364, 197 A.2d 1 (1964), and within
the year the legislature gave the Principal and Income Act retroactive effect. N.J. REv.
STAT. § 3A:14A-9 (Supp. 1965). Other states have had less trouble with retroactivity,
and it now seems fair to conclude that the constitutionality of such provisions will be
upheld. See ·Farmers Bank &: Capital Trust Co. v. Hulette, 293 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1956);
In re Warner's Trust, 263 Minn. 449, 117 N.W.2d 224 (1962); In re Estate of Valiquette,
122 Vt. 350, 173 A.2d 832 (1961); Will of Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W.2d 226 (1959). These
state cases rely, in good part, upon Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924). See
generally NEW YORK COMM'N ON EsTATES, 2D REPORT (Legis. Doc. 1963 No. 19) 196-99;
Ives, Allocating Stock Dividends, 91 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 851 (1952).
10. See Lowry v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 172 N.Y. 137, 64 N.E. 796 (1902);
McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N.Y. 179, 48 N.E. 548 (1897); Riggs v. Cragg, 89 N.Y. 479 (1882).
11. In the Matter of Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723 (1913).
·
12. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1926, ch. 843.
.
13. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 1005, § 2, as amended, ch. 336, § 2 (1965); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5(1) (1964). The Pennsylvania enactment was apparently preceded
by judicial adoption of a similar 6% rule, although a footnote inserted at the conclusion of the majority opinion casts some doubt upon the prospective effect of the
rule. Catherwood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961). However, the judicial version
ordered a computation on the basis of total ~istributions in the current year, rather
than upon a distribution-by-distribution basis.
The New Jersey Legislature, following a suggestion of the state's supreme court,
In re Arens, 41 N.J. 364, 384, 197 A.2d I, 12 (1964), adopted in 1964 a small-stock-dividend allocation rule similar to those·currently in effect in New York and Pennsylvania,
but with a 4% cutoff rather than 6%. N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A:14A-4 (Supp. 1965).
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York's comprehensive Principal and Income Act,14 adopted two years
later, retained the six per cent rule, but with modifications.1G Under
the 1965 formulation, a stock distribution which does not exceed
six per cent of the shares upon which the distribution is made is
allocated exclusively to income. Otherwise the distribution in its
entirety is an addition to principal. The Commissioners on Uniform
Sta~e Laws, after considering the six per cent rule, promulgated in
1962 a Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act16 which retains
the previously adopted Massachusetts rule.17
14. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw, art. 2A. See generally NEW YORK COIIIM'N ON EsTAT.ES, 3D
REPORT (Legis. Doc. 1964 No. 19) 300; Barclay, Legislation in Aid of Administration,
104 TRUSIS & EsTAT.ES 728 (1965).
15. "A distribution by a corporation or association made to a trustee in the shares
of the distributing corporation or association held in such trust, whether in the form
of a stock split or stock dividend, at the rate of six per cent or less of the shares upon
which the distribution is made, shall be income. Any such distribution at a greater rate
shall be principal." N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 27•e·2. Like the New York law, the Pennsylvania and New Jersey statutes allocate each stock distribution individually. That is, if a
particular distribution, in and of itself, does not exceed the cutoff percentage it is im•
mediately allocable to income, without regard to the existence or timing of any other
distributions made by that corporation. There were two forerunners to this form of the
6% rule. The third tentative draft of the Revised Uniform Act, which was ultimately
rejected by the Commissioners, made an allocation based upon the total amount of all
distributions received from a corporation in the corporate fiscal year; it did not deal
with each distribution -individually. If the total amount exceeded 6% it was fully
allocable to principal; othenvise it belonged entirely to income. The 1963 amendment
Jo § 17(a) of the N.Y. Personal Property Law, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 1005, § 2, re•
pealed by the 1965 Principal and Income Act, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 336, § 2, al•
located stock distributions received in the trust year to principal to the extent they
exceeded 6% of ·the number of shares of that stock held in the trust.
It seems clear that the form of the rule now in effect in New York, Pennsylvania,
and New Jersey is the best of the three approaches. In the first place, it is the most
easily administered. Under the New York 1963 amendment an apportionment was required, in that all stock distributions received in the trust year were to be allocated
to income to the extent of 6%, Although the third draft made a total allocation to
one account or the other, thus eliminating any need to apportion, all distributions received in the corporate fiscal year were to be totalled before the allocation could be
made. This appears unsatisfactory, as it causes a delay and quite possibly superimposes
upon ,the trust year several staggered corporate fiscal years.
In addition to the administrative preferability of the present form of the rule, it
does not appear that it will be arbitrary in practical effect when compared with the
1963 amendment, which incorporated the fairness of an apportionment. Statistics in•
dicate that the ovenvhelming percentage of small stock distributions do not exceed 6%,
See Niles, The New 6% Stock Distribution Rule, 102 TRUSTS &: EsTAT.ES 648 (1963). As
few dividends of 7-9% are declared, the incongruous situation where an income benefi•
ciary receives all of a 6% and none of a 7% distribution may be considered a rarity.
New Jersey's 4% rule may be subject to some criticism in this respect, however.
16. "Corporate distributions of shares of the distributing corporation, including distributions in the form of a stock split or stock dividend, are principal." REVISED UNI•
FORIII PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Ac:r: § 6(a). See generally Commissioners' Prefatory Note,
9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. 176 (Supp. 1964).
17. The Uniform Act and the New York Act are in basic agreement upon most of
the problems dealt with under the "principal and income" rubric. It is important to
consider the present discussion in light of this general agreement, because this comment, centering upon one narrow, although important, aspect of the broad scheme,
can give the impression ,that New York has completely rejected the values which can be
~ecognized from national statutory uniformity. This is not so; there is significant diver-
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· Although the eventual disappearance of the original Pennsylvania
rule of apportionment now seems virtually assured, the challenge
presented to the Massachusetts view by the six per cent rule may
prove far more formidable. 18 It is anticipated, therefore, that a numgence between the acts only with regard to the allocation of a corporation's distribution
of its own stock to its own shareholders. A brief, section by section, comparison of the
acts will illustrate the general correspondence. (a) The definitional sections are virtually
identical. Compare UPIA §§ 1, 3 with NYPIA §§ 27-b, 27-q. (b) The administrative
duty sections are generally identical, differing only in the phrasing of the scope of
trustee discretion. Compare UPIA § 2 with NYPIA § 27-a. (c) The sections pertaining
to the date upon which the right to income arises are identical in substance, with
minor differences .in wording. Compare UPIA § 4 with NYPIA § 27-c. (d) The sections
on income earned during the administration of a decedent's estate are alike except that
the New York act makes special provision for a situation that arose in Matter of
Shubert, 10 N.Y.2d 461, 180 N.E.2d 410 (1962). Compare UPIA § 5 with NYPIA § 27-d.
(e) The bond premium and discount sections are identical, except that the New York
act employs a broader phraseology, similar to that of several other states adopting the
Uniform Act, which enlarges the section's scope. Compare UPIA § 7 with NYPIA § 27-f.
(f) New York omits the section on farm operations, UPIA § 8(b), but the sections on
business operations are identical. Compare UPIA § 8(a) with NYPIA § 27-g. (g) The
natural resource sections are identical in wording and substance. Compare UPIA § 9
with NYPIA § 27-h. (h) The sale-of-timber sections are identical. Compare UPIA § 10
with NYPIA § 27-i. (i) The sections on other depletable property differ; the Uniform
Act allocates 5% to income, see UPIA § 11, whereas New York uses a prudent-man
standard, see NYPIA § 27-j. (j) The underproductive-property sections are similar in
basic wording but differ in ,t:lvo important respects. New York specifically excludes
marketable securities and sets no time limitation upon the non-apportionment of land
acquired by mortgage foreclosure. Compare UPIA § 12 with NYPIA § 27-k. (k) The
sections on charges against income and principal differ significantly because of certain
unique features of established New York practice, but there is no fundamental disagreement. Compare UPIA § 13 with NYPIA § 27-l. (I) The important sections on
retroactive application are identical. Compare UPIA § 14 with NYPIA § 27-m; see·
note 9 supra. In conclusion, the New York act adopts verbatim the statement in the
Uniform Act to the effect that its general purpose is uniformity. Compare UPIA § 15
with NYPIA § 27-n.
See Barclay, New York's Proposed Principal and Income Act, 102 TRusrs & EsrATES
689 (1963); Bogert, Uniform Principal and Income Act Revised, 101 TRUSTS & EsrATES
787 (1962); Dunham, Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 102 TRUSTS & EsrATES
210 (1963); Note, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 473. For a discussion of the specific points of departure bet:lveen the acts, see Barclay, supra note 14.
There are several substantively identical provisions within the corporate distributions sections of the t:IVO acts. (a) Subscription rights are principal. UPIA § 6(a); NYPIA
§ 27-e-4. (b) Distributions stemming from the call of shares, mergers, and liquidations by
corporate decision or court decree are principal. UPIA § 6(b); NYPIA §§ 27-e-5, 6. (c)
The sections differentiating bet:lveen various distributions of regulated investment companies are identical. Compare UPIA § 6(c) with NYPIA § 27-e-7. (d) Options to receive
in cash or stock are income. UPIA § 6(d); NYPIA § 27-e-8. (e) Each act has a general
provision that all other distributions are income. UPIA § 6(d); NYPIA § 27-e-10.
In addition, the New York act covers certain items which are not mentioned in the
Uniform Act. For instance, it is made clear that the settlor's specificaton is binding, see
§ 27-e-l, and that the trustee shall not be liable if he retains in principal an item about
which he is uncertain, though it turns out to be income. See § 27-e-12.
18. Two other resolutions of the -problem of the allocation of stock distributions
have recently been suggested. Neither is treated extensively in this comment because
neither has attracted sufficient support ,to be considered a viable alternative to the 6%
and Massachusetts rules.
·
(1) The "prudent man" rule. This approach has been adopted by statute in.Delaware. Under •the Delaware _formulation, '.1 trustee sh~ trC!lt all propel'ty received as
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her of states will reevaluate their rules regulating the allocation of
stock distributions between principal and income. It is hoped that
the following discussion of the Massachusetts and six per cent rules
and their ramifications will provide the necessary guidelines for
legislators who must permanently resolve this issue in order to avoid
a duplication of those problems with which trustees and draftsmen
in Pennsylvania and New York have been forced to contend as a
result of vacillating statutory framework.
II.

EFFECTUATING SETTLoR's PROBABLE INTENT THROUGH
STATUTORY ENACTMENT

Rarely, if ever, does a settlor define "income" when he provides
that "income" or "net income" be paid to one person, while ''principal" or "corpus" be held for another.19 Thus, the initial inquiry in
a corporate distribution as income to the extent that, in the judgment of the trustee, it
would be regarded by men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence in the management
of their own affairs as income from the investment. DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 12, § 3526
(Supp. 1964). For criticisms of this rule, see NEW YORK CoMM'N ON EsrATES, 2D REPORT
(Legis. Doc. 1963 No. 19) 177; Dunham, Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act,
101 TRUSIS & EsTATES 894, 896 (1962).
(2) "Anticipatory apportionment." This plan provides for the periodic invasion of
corpus to maintain the income beneficiary's rate of return. The trustee would multiply
the market value of the stock at the beginning of the year by the bond yield, and then,
at the end of the year, distribute sufficient corpus to make up the amount by which this
figure exceeded the dividends received. See text accompanying notes 24-26 infra; Aronstein, Common Stocks in Trust, 113 U, PA. L. REv. 228, 253 (1964); Aronstein, Toward
Growth With Fair Return, 104 TRUSTS &: EsrATES 788 (1965). For a critical view of this
suggestion, see Barclay, The Lot of the Income Beneficiary (pts. 1 &: 2), 104 TRUSTS &:
EsTATES 144, 277 (1965).
For an approach which seems to represent a combination of the "prudent man" and
"anticipatory apportionment" proposals, see Wells, Pity the Poor Income Beneficiary,
103 TRusrs & EsrATES 119 (1964), suggesting anticipatory apportionment on a prudent
man basis, rather than through the application of a specific formula.
19. The meaning of "income" differs according to its context. To the corporation,
the excess of revenues over expenses may be considered income. However, for tax purposes that excess is not income to the individual shareholder because he must part with
some of his proportionate interest in the corporation in order to realize any tangible
benefit. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); note 47 infra and accompanying
text. Yet, if this same shareholder is the income beneficiary of a trust, it may be argued
that for allocation purposes corporate earnings should be considered income,
Both the Uniform Act and the New York act begin with the same definition: "Income is the return in money or property derived from the use of principal ••• ," RE·
VISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Ac::r § 3(a); N.Y. PERS. PROP. I.Aw § 27-b-1. However, the acts proceed ,to modify this definition, in opposite ways, in their sections
concerning corporate distributions.
The question of what significance the usual settlor ascribes to the source of the distributed property is of course essential to any discussion of allocation rules in general.
For example, should cash or stock dividends from paid-in surplus be considered income?
Sh!)uld cash or stock dividends from earned surplus acquired prior to the trust's purchase of the shares be income? However, for the purposes of the present discussion this
problem is not really relevant, as neither the 6% rule nor the Massachusetts rule dis•
tinguishes between stock splits and stock dividends, and neither can be preferred on
the ground that it does or does not give weight to the source of the distribution. It will
therefore be assmp.ed that all increased bopk value and all capitalized distributionii
derive from operational earnings. There is an obvious caveat here, however. Inherent
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'interpreting the trust instrument is necessarily directed to determining the se_ttlor's intent.20 Likewise, it would seem that legislators,
when analyzing the merits of the Massachusetts and six per cent
rules, should be initially concerned with adopting a statute most
closely incorporating the settlor's probable intent. It becomes immediately apparent in the context of the allocation of stock distributions, however, that a settlor could, if he considered the problem,
adopt any one of several constructions for "income."
If it is the conclusion of the legislature that the settlor would
generally construe "income" in light of the nature of corporate
ownership, the Massachusetts rule should be adopted. Common stock
is not evidence of a debt, but rather of participation in the success
or failure of a business enterprise. Given the discretion of the board
of directors in distributing or retaining earnings,21 the settlor would,
upon considering the question in this light, probably intend his term
"income" to encompass only actual distributions of corporate assets. 22
Under such a construction of the settlor's intent, all stock dividends
would be allocated to principal, for the distribution of a stock dividend does not alter corporate net worth. Previously withheld earnings remain in the hands of the corporation. Before a trustee can be
said to have realized tangible value, he must sell the stock received
as a dividend, thus surrendering a portion of the trust's participation
in future earnings and diluting whatever control may have been
possessed. Since the same amount of money could have been received
through a·sale of the same proportionate share of the trust's holdings
before the dividend, the distribution of the dividend does not in any
way facilitate the trustee's realization of tangible assets, and thus
cannot be considered income.
:
in the reasoning supporting the 6% rule is an assumption, with some empirical basis,
that small stock distributions generally have their source in the capitalization of
earned surplus, and that the rule is not therefore subject to the criticism that it allocates to income that which the settlor would never consider to be income: unearned
surplus. See Shapleigh, How Fair Is the Six Percent Rule on Stock Distributions?, 104
TRUSTS &: EsTATES 908 (1965).
20, Although it is clear that the settlor's intention is the ultimate allocation determinant, there has been some question whether a direction in a will to allocate stock
distributions to .principal would constitute an invalid accumulation of income in those
states where ,the law would otherwise assign part of the distribution to the income
account. It was so held in Maris's Estate, 301 Pa. 20, 151 Atl. 577 (1930). However, New
York is to the contrary, Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 250 N.Y. 1, 164 N.E. 723 (1928);
and the Pennsylvania holding has subsequently been changed by statute, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 301.6 (Supp. 1965).
21. See Moskowitz v. Bantrell, 190 A.2d 749 (Del. 1963); 11 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoR- .
PORATIONS § 5325 n.72 (perm. ed. rev. rep!. 1958). Two cases in New York suggest an
exception for,corporations controlled by trustees. In the Matter of Adler, 164 Misc. 544,
299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937); In the Matter of McLaughlin, 164 Misc. 539, 299
N.Y. Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
22. Any possible distinctions that might be developed between the treatment of preferred and common stocl<, or between varying classes of common, are not considered
in the present discussion, since little or no sentiment for the making of such distinctions exists. Simplicity is the admitted goal of both rules.
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If, however, the legislature concludes that the settlor would
generally construe "income" in light of the practical consequences
to the income beneficiary, then it might find merit in the six per cent
rule. Certainly a settlor might reason that although a share of stock
does not entitle the holder to any more than a proportionate participation in actual distributions, the holder may realize the value of the
retained earnings, or some part thereof, through increased market
value of the stock. Theoretically, the increased book value which
derives from the retention of earnings will be reflected by the price
of the stock, and the price may even increase to a disproportionate
extent in response to the anticipation of the future growth suggested
by such retention. Thus, the settlor might equate the term "income"
with the full amount of corporate earnings, or some fixed portion
thereof, expecting that the earnings will be tangibly realized by the
income beneficiaries through periodic sales of shares held by the
trustee in the principal account. The timing of the sales and the
computation of the number of shares to be sold present problems23
probably best solved by a device called "anticipatory apportionment."24 This means of apportionment calls for distribution to income beneficiaries from the trust corpus whenever the pure income
yield on the corpus falls below the current bond yield, as determined
by an acceptable national index. However, a definition which equates
income with some fixed portion of corporate earnings, whether or
not actually distributed, and which quite logically compels some type
of periodic apportionment is an extreme definition which supporters
of the six per cent rule are not forced to accept. Rather, they may
more moderately conclude that the typical settlor uses the term "income" to mean simply a return to tl;le income beneficiaries larger
than that provided by cash dividends, at least in those cases where,
. because of the retention of earnings, the yield from cash dividends
is significantly low'er than the bond yield.25 Periodic apportionment
would accomplish a full-scale effectuation of such an intention. However, it presents some danger of stunting the growth of the corpus,
and thus in the long run might adversely affect both income beneficiaries and remaindermen. 26 This danger, coupled with the revo23. Such problems include the quest/-ons of when there has been a sufficient increase
in book value and market price to warrant a sale, whether a rise in market price has
been caused by the retention of earnings or by some combination of speculation and
inflation, and what treatment should be accorded decreases in market value.
24. See note 18 supra.
'
25. This conclusion is supported by the fact that most of the anti-inflationary benefit
from holding common stock accrues to the remainderman. While the market price of
the stock will tend to rise with the cost of living, accompanying increases in an initially
deflated cash dividend will provide little protection for the income beneficiary.
26. Without attempting a comprehensive criticism, it might be suggested that irt
developing his theory of anticipatory apportionment Aronstein, Common Stoclcs in
Trust, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 228 (1964), overemphasizes the income beneficiary's predicament, and is consequently driven to .this rather drastic solution. He assumes that the
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lutionary nature of periodic apportionment, indicates that it is not
a viable alternative solution. Nevertheless, it is clear that the six per
cent rule is a closer approximation than the Massachusetts rule to
the intent of a settlor wishing to provide the income beneficiaries
with an amount greater than that of the cash dividends alone.
The differences in yield between stock and debt securities are
significant. Since 1962 the average yield on long-term taxable Treasury bonds has fluctuated between 3.8% and 4.25%, and the average
yield on Aaa and Aa corporate bonds has varied between 4.25 % and
4.6%. In the same time period, the average yield upon industrial
common stocks has never exceeded 3.8% and has gone as low as
2,8%.27 Thus, trust assets in the form of common stock produce
about one per cent less current income than do debt securities.28 The
allocation of small stock dividends to income cannot completely correct this situation. Not every corporation whose stock yields less than
four per cent makes recurring stock distributions in an amount sufficient to compensate for the depressed cash yield. In addition, stock
distributions which are made may exceed six per cent and thus be of
no benefit to the income beneficiary.29 On the other hand, the distributing corporation may be one which already returns a sufficient
common stock corpus will yield only 3½% in cash dividends and that the value of the
corpus will appreciate only about 5% per year, while the bond yield is assumed to be
a constant 4½%· As a result, he concludes that the common stock yield does not ;each
the level of the bond yield until the tenth year. However, the following figures indicate
that this may be somewhat pessimistic, and that the yields may become comparable
within four or five years. The income and growth stocks listed here were among the
most popular with trustees in 1964 and 1965. See A Good Investment Year, 104 TRUSTS
&: EsTATES 29 (1965); The figures are derived from 1965 volumes of STANDARD &: Pooa's,
STANDARD CORPORATION DESCRIPTIONS.
Income Stocks
1954
yield
GM
4.5
AT&: T
5.4
Stand. N.J.
5.0
Socony
5.1
Phillips
4.1
Amer. Cyan.
4.1
Int. Paper
4.2
Amer. Can
3.7
CIT Fin.
5.9
Cont. Ins.
3.4
United Gas
4.2
Average
4.5
Combined
Average
• Based on 1954 price.

1964
yield•
17.0
7.0
9.9
8.0
6.3
8.2
4.9
4.8
8.4
5.3
5.5
7.8

Growth Stocks
1954
yield
GE
3.6
Texaco
5.2
DuPont
4.0
Union Carb.
3.2
Sears-Roeb.
4.5
Gen. Foods
4.0
East. Kodak
3.4
Gulf Oil
3.6
Dow Chem.
2.5
3.1
Caterpillar
4.0
Merck
3.7
Average
4.1

1964
yield•
5.2
10.3
5.3
4.6
8.4
11,8
8.8
9.1
4.4
14.1
14.0

s!i

8.2

27. See Moody's Investors Yield Table, 104 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 796 (1965).
28. See authorities cited note 18 supra; Niles, The New 6% Stock Distribution Rule,
102 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 648 (1963); Shapleigh, supra note 19.
29. But see note 15 supra.
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cash yield, so that the stock distribution will result in an excessive
allocation to the income beneficiary. However, in contradistinction
to the Massachusetts rule, which necessarily aggravates any unfairness
to the income beneficiary, the six per cent rule does provide some
measure of alleviation, and there is empirical evidence which indicates that the impact may be significant.30 Recent trends also suggest
that the number of small stock dividends declared will rise in years
to come, increasing the impact of the method of allocation employed.
Although in the period from 1949 to 1954 there were only 686 stock
dividends and splits declared by corporations listed on the New York
Stock Exchange,31 there were 1549 declared between 1959 and 1964.82
Thus, the essence of the argument for the six per cent rule, which
allocates small stock distributions to income, is not that such distributions are in fact the equivalent of ordinary cash dividends, but
rather that the term "income" encompasses more than cash distributions, because retained earnings may be realized upon through the
increased market value of the stock. It is not argued by proponents
of the six per cent rule that the shares received as the result of a
stock dividend represent a valuable distribution of corporate property. Such a dividend is simply viewed as a convenient mechanism
for the partial alleviation of what is felt to be an imbalance between
the trust's principal and income accounts-a workable means of reallocating part of what may rightfully belong to income, given the
difference in yield between equity and debt securities.
Yet the Uniform Act rejects the six per cent rule. 38 Several
reasons have been put forth to explain the rejection. The first is an
extension of the definitional argument discussed previously.84 It was
suggested that the settlor might equate "income" from common stock
with- total corporate earnings because the stockholder is an owner
of the enterprise and, although he cannot force a distribution of the
30. See generally Shapleigh, supra note 19.
31. See 1965 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FAcr BooK 38.
32. Ibid. Three factors account for the present popularity of stock dividends.
Retained earnings are an inexpensive source of new capital, avoiding the selling costs
of a public offering. There can be benefit to the shareholder, as the declaration of
an extra stock dividend may precipitate a somewhat illogical rise in market price,
which can be converted into cash at capital gains rates. In addition, it is often said
that a stock dividend conserves cash for the corporation. Sec Corey, Cash Plus Stoch
Dividends, 98 TRusrs &: EsTATES 339 (1959). For a critical view of this assertion, sec
Barclay, Stock Dividends Belong to Pri1fcipal, 103 TRUsrs &: EsTATES 482 (1964).
33. The third tentative draft of the Uniform Act revision adopted a form of the
6% rule, in preference to the Massachusetts rule, but the 6% rule was rejected in the
final draft. See note 15 supra; Dunham, supra note 18. It is interesting to trace a change
of .position by George C. Barclay. Compare articles favoring the 6% rule, written as
late as March 1964, Third Draft of Revised Principal and Income Act, 101 TRUSTS &:
EsTATES 505 (1962), The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 101 id. 833 (1962),
Supervision of Trust Powers to Comptroller?, 101 id. 833 (1962), and Dividend Allocation
Powers, 103 id. 272 (1964), with. Barclay, Stock Dividends Belong to Principal, 103 id.
482 (1964).
34. See Barclay, supra note 32.
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earnings,85 he can re11lize upon these earnings by selling part of his
ownership interest, which the .retention has caused to appreciate in
value. However, this reasoning can be carried a step further. Common stock is an interest in a business enterprise, the management
of which is entrusted to a board of directors. Cash dividends are the
only return from this interest. A stock dividend or split, which is not
a distribution of earnings and does not alter the proportionate interest of the shareholder, cannot be considered income in and of
itself. Furthermore, there is no persuasive reason why the income
beneficiary should have any claim to retained earnings. The board
of directors decides upon this immediate reinvestment with the expectation that it will result in increased future earnings, which will
permit increased cash dividends. 36 These will of course accrue to the
income beneficiary. Thus, it might be concluded that the typical
settlor contemplating trust ownership of stock would rely upon the
judgment of the. board of directors regarding the long-run advisability of distributing or retaining earnings, and would expect his
income beneficiary to receive only those earnings distributed as cash
dividends, rather than the greater amount with which proponents of
the six per cent rule seek to effectuate what they view as the intent
of the settlor. 37 In addition, it must be remembered that if a retention of earnings is successful it may well cause the cash yield to surpass comparable bond yield in a very few years.88

Ill.

EFFECTUATING SETTLOR'S INTENT THROUGH TRUSTEE'S
DISCRETION

In light of the variety of views a settlor could reasonably take
with respect to the meaning of the ambiguous term "income," it is
apparent that any attempt to develop a generalized conception of
the typical settlor's intention through manipulation of the legal
attributes of stock and stock dividends is fruitless. Since the actual
intention of the settlor is as varied as the family situation, it would
seem that, rather than attempting to anticipate intention by statute,
the construction and effectuation of the settlor's purpose is best relegated to the discretion of the trustee, with the usual judicial supervision and remedial sanctions. There are several channels through
which this discretion may operate. First, the trustee may fashion the
trust portfolio to accomplish the purposes which he feels the settlor
intended. If the primary concern is for the remaindermen, as, for
example, when the income beneficiary is otherwise well provided
for, the bulk of the corpus may be invested in growth stocks show35.
36.
37.
38.

See
See
See
See

note 21 supra.
note 26 supra.
text accompanying note 25 supra.
note 26 supra.
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ing low cash yields. On the other hand, if the income beneficiary
has pressing needs and the remaindermen are remote or unascertained secondary recipients, a more substantial return may be
achieved by purchasing debt securities and income-oriented stocks
showing significant cash yields. Such portfolio manipulation can
reduce potential unfairness under the Massachusetts rule. However,
it is asserted by proponents of the six per cent rule that the six
per cent rule allows the trustee to hold reliable low-yield growth
stocks even when the primary trust purpose is the production of
income. This argument assumes, however, that the corporations
whose shares are considered a desirable growth stock regularly distribute small stock dividends, which does not at present appear to be
the case,39 and that good income stocks do not appreciate in value,
which also appears not to be the case.4°Furthermore, even under the
six per cent rule the trustee must rely heavily upon high-yield securities when income is the primary goal.
The second, and probably more desirable, mechanism for effecting the settlor's intention is the power of invasion. The trustee is not
required to make any income distributions, but is authorized, in his
discretion, to distribute as much from both principal and income
as he feels to be appropriate.41 Such an authorization liberates the
trustee's investment policy. Rather than structure the portfolio for
the immediate production of income, he may choose those securities
which promise the best return in terms of a combination of cash yield
and market appreciation. Ultimately this is the most favorable course
for the income beneficiaries as well as for the remaindermen, because
the absolute cash income, even without exercise of the power to invade, will tend to increase as the securities grow in market value. But
the most important aspect of a power to invade is .that it provides a
complete remedy for any undervaluation of the income beneficiary's
share. Unlike the six per cent rule, the remedy is not dependent for
its effectiveness upon the vagaries of corporate financial decisions.
The power to invade eliminates the danger that, in any given trust
year, there may be too few or too many small stock distributions to
provide a fair return for the income beneficiary. However, the six
per cent rule may create some pitfalls for the draftsman who seeks to
use the power to invade to accomplish this more complete solution.
That is, not only is the six per cent rule a less effective remedy, but
it may also make employment of the better solution hazardous. The
statutory characterization of small stock distributions as income,
coupled with powers to accumulate income or to allocate stock
dividends, or coupled with a direction that stock dividends be al39. See Aronstein, Common Stocks in Trust, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 228, 244 (1964);
A Good Investment Year, 104 TRUSTS & EsTATES 29 (1965).
40. See note 26 supra; Barclay, supra note 32, at 484.
41. See generally 2 Scorr,

TRUSTS

§§ 187.2, .3 (2d ed. 1956).
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located to principal,42 can create interpretative problems where legal
consequences depend upon whether the settlor has allocated "all of
the income" to the income beneficiary. For example, valid use of the
federal estate tax marital deduction may require that the surviving
spouse be entitled, for life, to "all the income" from certain of the
decedent's property.43 Of greater interest in New York is the possibility that the surviving spouse's limited right of election will not be
effectively foreclosed by a trust which allows the reallocation of small
stock distributions. It has been held that the full income of the trust
must, on the face of the will, be given to the surviving spouse in
order to pre-empt an election.44 Certainly these hurdles are not insurmountable, but ·they do suggest that the six per cent rule can have
unexpected side effects which are most troublesome for the more
careful draftsmen.
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the six per cent rule is not
without practical merit. If ·the settlor has not given the trustee adequate powers for the diversification of investment and the discre- ,
tionary distribution of corpus, the six per cent rule may well provide
an important measure of relief for the income beneficiary. It is, of
course, in these cases, where careful planning is absent, that the statutory rules of allocation are most important. Of course, if the legislature concludes that trust law should facilitate the legitimate and careful planning of experienced draftsmen rather than catering to and
relieving the inadvertent and inexpert, the primary emphasis of the
six per cent rule, directed as it is at alleviating the consequences of
inadequate planning, is fundamentally suspect.
IV.

NoNSUBJEGrIVE CONSIDERATIONS

A number of other grounds for rejection of the six per cent rule
have been suggested. First, through the receipt of stock dividends the
income beneficiary is able to acquire part of the basis of the trust assets and thus, upon sale, to reduce his tax burden at the expense of the
42. It might be suggested that a power of invasion can be effective without these
concomitant powers of accumulation, and ,thus without contravening .the 6% rule.
However, it is often thought desirable that the trustee be able to redirect stock dividends to facilitate administration. Certainly, the textual discussion is less appropriate
when administrative facility is not felt to necessitate such powers.
It might also be suggested that the trustee be given the power to allocate, in the
first instance, between principal and income. In such cases, when receipts are classified
as principal from the outset rather than being income originally and then redirected
through the trustee's administrative power of appointment, it is less likely that problems concerning the marital deduction and the New York right of election stemming
from the phrase "all the income" will be encountered. But see Blish, Discretionary
Allocation Provisions, 45 TRUST BuLL. 35 (1965).
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5). But see Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5{f)(3), (4)
Q%~
.
44. See In the Matter of Kunc, 43 Misc. 2d 387, 251 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Surr. Ct. 1964).
But see In the Matter of Baileson, 16 N.Y.2d 757, 262 N.Y.S.2d 487, 209 N.E.2d 810
(1965); In the Matter of Edwards, 2 Misc. 2d 564, 152 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Surr. Ct. 1956).
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remaindermen.45 Although it is arguable that such a windfall to the
income beneficiary is consonant with the purposes of the six per cent
rule, since that rule augments the depressed return which the income
beneficiary may be receiving, it is more in keeping with the presumed
intention of the settlor and the assumptions inherent in the Internal
Revenue Code's conduit theory of taxation of trust income40 to
expect that the remainderman will have the full benefit of the basis.
If small stock distributions are to be treated as income for trust purposes because it is assumed that the settlor would desire some supplement to income when stock is held, they should also be treated as
income for tax purposes. It may be suggested, in response, that this
is a flaw in the tax law, rather than in the six per cent rule, and that
the criticism is therefore misdirected. This argument, however, raises
a second problem. It is conceivable that remedial activity in the tax
laws could extend beyond a mere provision preserving basis for the
principal account and precipitate a reevaluation of Eisner v. Macomber,41 the foundation of the present nontaxable status of stock
dividends. 48 The reasoning of Macomber is sound when applied to
• the individual shareholder-tax.payer, since the nature and extent of
his interest in the corporation are not changed by the dividend, but
are simply represented by a greater number of shares. Accumulated
earnings are not paid out and thus are not realized. However, when
the shareholder is a trust, and local law commands that six per cent
stock dividends be distributed as income, there is clearly a realization
from the income beneficiary's standpoint. Such a stock dividend may
possess sufficient independent significance to be considered an appropriate taxable event. Indeed, Mr. Justice Brandeis, who, along with
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissented in Macomber, made specific reference
to the Pennsylvania rule of apportionment to support his contention
that stock dividends may be considered income.49 However, a reexamination of Macomber is certainly unlikely at this late date. Although apparently near rejection following Helvering v. Griffiths, 50
the Macomber doctrine was reaffirmed and given specific legislative
approval with the enactment of section 305(a) of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code, and could probably weather any storm created by
investigation into the present provisions concerning allocation of
basis.
Difficulty in administration has been suggested, apparently by
analogy to the discredited Pennsylvania rule of apportion~ent, as a
45. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 307(a).
46. See Subchapter J.
47. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). See Dunham, supra note 18, at 895.
48. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 305.
49. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 233·37 (1920). See Lowndes, The Taxation of
Stock Dividends and Stock Rights, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 147 (1947).
50. 318 U.S. 371 (1943).
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third collateral criticism of the six per cent rule. 51 An immediate reallocation of basis will be required following all distributions of six
per cent or less. In addition, the volume of small distributions which
will have to be processed may increase as corporations returning low
yields seek to make their stock more at~ractive for trust investment.
On the other hand, under the six per cent rule as it is now worded,
a trustee need only determine the distribution ratio to know whether
to allocate entirely to income or entirely to principal. The former
problems of differentiating stock splits and stock dividends, of distinguishing ordinary and extraordinary distributions, of computing
"intact value," and of determining the source of the assets capitalized
are all eliminated. Therefore, although experience with the six per
cent rule may ultimately dictate a different conclusion, it would
appear that the administrative problems are not burdensome.
Finally, it has been suggested that in the interests of uniformity
the Massachusetts rule embodied in the Uniform Act is preferable to
the six per cent rule. 52 Although there is some merit in this suggestion, uniformity is not as pressing here as in other areas of the law,
and a possibly inferior provision should clearly not be accepted simply to promote uniformity.
These collateral criticisms of the six per cent rule thus appear to
be little more than makeweights. None is of sufficient substance by
itself to support acceptance or rejection of either the six per cent rule
or the Massachusetts rule. However, since legislative opinion on this
matter must rest upon a balance of individually insignificant factors,
the criticisms are worth considering.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Pennsylvania rule of apportionment can be considered a rule
of fairness only upon the assumption that the term "income," as used
in the trust instrument, is to be fully equated with current corporate
earnings. Such an equation is at best tenuous; "income" expresses the
settlor's intention, which in all likelihood embodies an expectation
that some earnings will be retained. Even if "income" is construed
to be a term of art, any definition formulated with a clear understanding of the nature of corporate ownership would allocate stock
dividends to principal. Thus the six per cent rule must rely upon
the undervaluation of the income beneficiary's share caused by the
. growing trust investment in low-yield stock to maintain its case of unfairness against the Massachusetts rule. Yet there is a more satisfac51. See Dunham, supra note 18, at 895.
52. See Niles, supra note 28. The author also suggests that, because of precedent and
reliance by draftsmen, the Massachusetts rule should be retained in New York. It does
not seem likely, however, that a settlor wishing to have the Massachusetts rule applied
would do so by silent reliance, rather than simply directing that all stock distributions
be allocated to principal.
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tory method of dealing with this undervaluation. Responsible drafting and careful investment can provide adequately for the income
beneficiary. Power in the trustee to accumulate and invade can provide a flexible means-a means far more complete and workable than
the six per cent rule-of balancing the successive interests in a trust.
Although the six per cent rule may alleviate harshness in restrictively
dra,m trusts, the possible pitfalls which it poses for careful draftsmen, under federal income and estate tax law as well as local decedent estate law, coupled with the danger of its causing increased
administrative burdens for the trustee, would appear to outweigh its
beneficial effects.
Michael G. Devine

